John "Game of Life" Conway: particles have the same kind of free will that people have
Kevin Kelly linked to a paper "co-authored by mathematician John Conway, inventor of a cellular automata demonstration known as the Game of Life, [who] argues that you can't explain the spin or decay of particles by randomness, nor are they determined, so free will is the only option left."
From the paper (The Strong Free Will Theorem):
Some readers may object to our use of the term “free will” to describe the indeterminism of particle responses. Our provocative ascription of free will to elementary particles is deliberate, since our theorem asserts that if experimenters have a certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom. Indeed, it is natural to suppose that this latter freedom is the ultimate explanation of our own.Particles Have Free Will
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Isn't this how Tron was possible?
The 'simple' complexity of the computer system was subject to chaotic (chaordic?) quantum feedback fluctuations so that infinitely finer layers of heterarchical complexity could entelechicise (I know, I know...) with-in the framework of the simpler system.
Now. I'm not suggesting that this was a fractal phen...
Is that the radio entelechy ringing?
-2k
wait... wait... so i'm made of particle that also have free will, and they can just decide they've had enough of my shenanigans and leave? I'm basically a collective? I think I need to be high to think about this...
Brain exploding.
Every scientific advance in modernity has come from asserting some kind of monism. Newton asserted that all objects were subject to the same force of gravity. Darwin asserted that all bioforms are subject to the forces of selection and mutation. Our steps towards a unified field theory have the same assumption. What Conway has presented is a continuation of this line of thinking: there is no essential difference between the laws governing particles and really big sets of particles (read: human bodies). I look forward to the theoretical ramifications of this paper.
Bah! This sounds a little too much like attributing lightning to Thor because we don't understand it well enough.
Sounds like miticlorians.
Huh?
We don't know all the possible determinants of an individual particle's decay, so we have no means to predict that decay, either causally (if it's determined) or statistically (if it's random).
Unpredictability is not proof of free will.
(And besides, many theorists are now coming to believe that randomness and order are the same phenomenon viewed on different scales.)
- and we don´t have free will. We just think we have. There´s a large difference.
But it looks like Conway is already committing to a particular, contra-causal or "agent causation" definition of free will, in his third axoim:
There are lots of other ideas about free will out there, including the "combatibilist" idea which I favor, that states that determinism and free will are compatible (as long as you adjust what you really mean by "free will"). When I heard Conway lecture on this in Berkeley a few years ago, I felt he was a bit philosophically naive about it, "demonstrating" his free will by holding up an eraser and saying he felt free to either drop it or not drop it.
False trichotomy?
Though it does sound like he's using "free will" to mean something other than the colloquial understanding, and then saying our concept of "free will" is also that new thing, and doesn't work like we think it does.
He's saying "free will" is "nonrandom indeterminism" which is interesting, but how do you falsify that? I don't think there is even an experiment that can falsify "randomness" without the use of time-travel.
Often the question in "free will" is, if you could rewind reality, would everything happen exactly the same way - i.e. is everything we are just a fated consequence of our chemical reactions, with no variability, or would we be 'free' to do things differently.
I dislike that question because the answer doesn't actually change anything practical whatsoever. Given that you and I both are pretty sure we exist, and have memories, emotions, plans, aspirations, whether or not we figure out if we have this 'freedom' on a physical level is irrelevant - it's an analysis of what makes us up, it can not change who we already are.
In my mind, at that point, any philosophy about the nature of humanity based on some intangible 'freedom' is wankery disconnected from reality.
Sure their use of the phrase 'free will' is provocative, but only for the sake of being provocative, which is really kinda dull.
From a physics perspective, my shot in the dark is that the issue is trying to apply the attributes of the emergent system to the elementary building blocks.
There does seem to be an interesting argument hinted at in the summary about the indivisibility of free will - i.e. If a human has free will, what about half a human? An organ? A cell? A protein? An atom? etc., and asking whether there's any property wrt free will that changes along the way (and if this is in there somewhere, presumably their answer is 'no'). That's sort of a meta-discussion about free will, not really about humanity though.
Oh, I think I see. He's saying "If experimenters have free will, then particles must also have the same free will" and then uses some math to prove it.
The major premise is "experimenters have free will", which - though many of us may have opinions - is not really something we can falsify.
You mean... Schrodinger's cat was... MURDERED???
The premise that experimenters have free will is easy to falsify. Threaten to withdraw their funding and tenure, and they will start acting in extremely deterministic ways.
:-)
(Actually, I imagine there might be room for experiments in this area, designed around survival struggles.)
Philip Pullman already covered this ground with the concept of "Dust" in His Dark Materials series (Northern Lights/Golden Compass, Subtle Knife, Amber Spyglass). My favorite fantasy trilogy since Lord of the Rings.
What does any of this have to do with freeing a killer whale?
Silliness. "Free will" is a subjective experience, not a physical property, logical possibility, or even a coherent idea. When an event occurs, it occured either for a reason (determinism) or not (randomness). This is not confined to materialism. If your immortal soul or the Flying Spaghetti Monster exert their will and make a decision, either it was for a reason that would preclude any other decision, or it wasn't. Read some Kant, physicists.
The universe appears to be random within a structure of consistent probability, which on a large scale often generates "statistical determinism," in which all but a close cluster of outcomes become so improbable that practically speaking they'll never happen anywhere.* This isn't a third option, just a description of the nature of our randomness.
*Unless, of course, you have an Improbability Drive, which sort of throws a wrench in the works.
I'm so sick of people following the "such-and-such is mysterious, quantum mechanics is mysterious, ergo such-and-such is quantum mechanical in nature" train of thought. Quantum mechanics is cool and all, but people need to remember that it's not magic-- it's linear algebra.
somebody smack this guy with a fish.
People have tied themselves in knots because of the dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, which seems to require all kinds of magic: faster-than-light communication, a special role for consciousness, and so forth.
The many-worlds explanation is much cleaner: every time a quantum event occurs that can have multiple outcomes, the world effectively splits: in some worlds Schroedinger's cat lives, and in others it does not. In some worlds, my photon is spin-up and yours is spin-down and in some it's vice versa, but there are no worlds where they spin in the same direction. Outcomes are random but constrained. Everything that is possible actually happens, but in a different branch of the multiverse.
The issue with quantum mechanics (pertinent to this discussion) is that it predicts outcomes in probabilities only, which belies a deterministic universe.
Again, this is a matter of uncertainty born of imperfect knowledge. Because we don't have perfect knowledge, we live in a stochastic universe, which allows for the existence of free will (for all practical purposes).
In other words, as long as we don't see the strings, we can be call our choices our own.
But Many-Worlds just begs the question of free will, doesn't it? For every universe where you married Alice, there's another where you married Bob (despite what your mother said).
In fact, it could be argued that Many-Worlds is the ultimate deterministic scenario, because you will not fail to choose any of the possible paths in one universe or another.
Laplace's demon steeples its fingertips together and smiles ruefully at your anthropomorphized molecules.
Just then, Cantor entered the room and skewered LaPlace's Demon with a Diagonal thrust.
LOL! Conway is a great man and an innovative thinker. But theologians have been arguing for centuries over whether or not we have free will, or if our fate is predestined, and they still haven't figured that one out. So good luck making the same argument for particles.
#21, Bell's Theorem suggests that the reason why QM issues probabilistic predictions is not because we lack detailed knowledge of the world, but rather because the world is inherently detail-free.
But this article's take home message is somewhat strange. Via Bell's Theorem we know that QM is incompatible with "hidden variables." That being the case, there can be no explanation given for the behavior of quantum particles. So to suggest that "randomness" is an explanation of their behavior is misleading. "Randomness" doesn't explain why quantum particles behave as they do, it merely tells us what kinds of behaviors to expect. (It's like if I tell you to expect that your newborn baby will cry every night. I tell you what to expect without explaining why it cries.)
Similarly for "free will." Free will does not explain the behavior of anything; in a certain sense (not Hume's), saying "so-and-so has free will" is equivalent to admitting that there is no explanation for so-and-so's behavior.
So nothing is gained by moving from the concept of randomness to the concept of free will; and much is lost in terms of confusion.
And #4, the "monistic shift" you talk about was already worked out pretty well by the ancient Greeks (and probably earlier). It's pretty silly to think that Conway is the fist to get around to it. Perhaps I misunderstand your claim.
-Mikel
There was another article on BB that was about bees or fruit flies, with scientists suggesting that they exhibited free will, based on exactly this same idea.
My opinion hasn't changed. The human organism is so much more complex that attempting to directly map what is called 'free will' at particle level onto what is called 'free will' at the human level is impossible, one has to make something of an intuitive leap to get from one to the other. This makes it somewhat difficult to argue about.
People are generally predictable, and actually, so are particles, take the concept of half-life, for example. We don't know the exact moment when it's going to decay, but we do know that it is 100% going to decay within a certain time frame, this makes it both entirely predictable and unpredictable at the same time. It's 'freedom' is choosing the precise moment to decay within a given time frame, it can't choose not to decay at all.
So let's bump that up to humans. I can choose what to eat and when to eat, but I have to eat or I'll eventually die of starvation.
'Free will' as it's thought of ideally may not exist, or at least be misnamed. There does seem to definitely be an element of choice however, within certain parameters, for the human being.
Recognizing these choices exist isn't a given.
@SLIDA:
That's not what half-life means. It means half of a given quantity will decay within the half-life time period. On the level of individual particles, it means there is a 50% probability that it will decay within that time period. There is no fixed lifespan, since it's all probabilistic. For example, there is a 1/2^20 probability (about 1 in a million) that it will still be around after 20 half-lives. And if it is, there's still a 50% chance that it will survive the next half-life. It's like the time it takes to flip the "live or die" coin, where you keep flipping until it comes up die.
I should add that its constant, not periodic. It can decay at any moment, it's just that the more likely it is to decay in a given instant, the shorter the time period in which there's a 1/2 overall chance that it will have decayed.
you can't explain the spin or decay of particles by randomness, nor are they determined, so free will is the only option left
Someone ought to tell this guy that "we don't understand it, therefore intelligence must be behind it" is exactly the argument made by Intelligent Design nutjobs.
Someone also ought to tell this guy that physical science does not allow you to do a "we'll figure out what it isn't, and whatever is left that we can imagine is the cause, must be teh cause".
The issue is that he thinks he's exhaustively tried all other possibilities and that just isnt' how physical science works.
@7 (and others)
"Unpredictability is not proof of free will."
I've actually spent a little quality time with this paper (and strangely was sending someone an email about it when this story was posted -- do I have free will? :) ).
Interested people need to spend some time with it. It is not a proof of free will, and it doesn't claim to be. The arguments are more subtle and, frankly, more beautiful. It has more to do with laying to rest any hidden variable theories, be they based on QM or not. And the "free will" discussed is actually *not* just mere stochasticim.
Really, it's a cool paper and a fun read.
"#21, Bell's Theorem suggests that the reason why QM issues probabilistic predictions is not because we lack detailed knowledge of the world, but rather because the world is inherently detail-free."
Mikel, might it not be more instructive to say that Bell's Theorem suggests the world is inherently specificity-free? The details are there (or will be, in time), it's just that QM does not specify them up to a point.
I agree that free will is perhaps best defined by its antithesis; which is to say, as a lack of determinism.
#26 Anonymous
Recent thing along similar lines:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127011.600-can-fractals-make-sense-of-the-quantum-world.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=online-news
No, it's not really about free will.
Yes, QM is strange. This doesn't add strangeness, it just shows it in a certain light.
This disproves some hidden-variable theories but not all.
Best book untangling free will (from QM among other things): "Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Having" by Daniel Dennett.
#32, surprisingly no. Bell's Theorem implies that QM is incompatible with hidden variable models. So it isn't that we haven't yet modeled things in enough detail, it's that if we were to add variables we would violate QM.
This point concerns one of the essential striking features of QM. One of the initial concerns about QM was that it might be an "incomplete" theory with details left out. This was Einstein's view. But Bell's Theorem rules this out. If QM is correct, there are no hidden variables.
#26
Just to be annoyingly, disgustingly specific: Bell's theorem doesn't imply there can be no hidden variables, only that there can be no local hidden variables. Non-local hidden variable theories (which this paper seems to sort of be straining at) such as The Bohm interpretation may not be consistent with everything, but they are at the very least proof of that slight hole in Bell's.
@32
But one of the nice things about this paper is that, unlike some arguments against hidden variables, this one has assumes a very small set of physical axioms, and QM (on the whole) dosn't even need to be true. It is perhaps the clearest and refutation of hidden variables. If one accepts spin, twinning, and a non-infinite information transfer rate (three things which have a lot of empirical eveidence behind them), then hidden variables are logically impossible, even in as-of-yet uninvented theories. [unless, of course, we don't have free will.]
This paper is more a work of mathematics than physics, and as such should be read in a different light.
Non/determinism is important in philosophy, particularly in the problem of evil.
Of course, most physicists reject nondeterminism without considering it. Why else do they go to such lengths to construct deterministic alternatives such as hidden variables or many-worlds?
LOL @ #21 The Unusual Suspect.
"...as long as we don't see the strings..."
Classic.
For organisms, one way to define free will is behavior by an individual that is contrary or different than the group that would otherwise define the individual's behavior. To have free will then means that the individual's "will" belongs to the individual, not the group. A Jungian speaking of human psychology might call this individuation.
For example, for myself, free will would actually be MY will, which would be different than some social group's will. I may decide to change religions, grow a mohawk, drive against traffic, or in some other way behave differently than group will dictates.
As I recall from population biology 101, this kind of free will might be a driver of evolution. When a niche adaptation begins to fail a species in a given ecosystem, that species may very well perish. However, if an individual of that species is able to change its behavior slightly (say eat seed X instead of seed Y), that individual may avoid group doom and perhaps eventually spawn a new species.
#11 mentions the "indivisibility of free will - i.e. If a human has free will, what about half a human? An organ? A cell? A protein? An atom? etc." I've unfortunately been thinking a great deal about cancer lately. A cancer cell is a cell from an organ that stops behaving as it should. It no longer behaves as it is supposed to within its group. Specifically, it refuses to die like the other cells, but rather stays alive, and multiplies itself. I have decided to anthropomorphise this behavior into willed behavior -- I think that cancer cells are rebel cells that simply aren't gonna take orders anymore from their organ group.
But what I cannot figure out is whether these rebel cells understand the impact they have on the other cells, and ultimately whether they know they are part of a much larger assemblage of cells and organs.
@21
"Again, this is a matter of uncertainty born of imperfect knowledge."
Are you being sarcastic here (seriously, I don't know if these are supposed to be your words or the words of the physicists)? I ask because, if the former, this is precisely not the point. Uncertainty isn't born of imperfect knowledge; it's baked in to the situation. That's one of the whole points of arguments against hidden variables, and the present paper is thus far the most general argument presented.
@moriarty
I stand corrected, I still think the point works though, even if it lacks elegance, or even correct knowledge(lol). We know that it's going to decay, so it's behavior is predictable at some level.
What is up with the freakin' capthcas?
Ignore the captcha. If you fill it out, it will anonymize your comment.
I find it amazing how prevalent the idea is that free will is about decisions not being determined by the past. My personality, my knowledge, my inclinations, and my reasoning are all part of the past. If my decisions aren't determined by those, how exactly am I in control?
@ Marja 38:
The reason is because a deterministic theory is easy to describe mathematically, but a partly-deterministic one (where you can predict things, but not perfectly) is much harder.
For instance, the math behind quantum mechanics is perfectly deterministic, except for stuff trying to describe wave function collapse. Many-worlds doesn't really go to much length, it simply leaves that part out.
I think that it would be better to make a distinction between freedom and will. I am ready to agree that elementary particles have some sort of freedom (in the sense that their actions can be independent of their environment), but it is absurd to conclude that they have some sort of will that guides their actions. To me, a will would seem to require some sort of nervous system or brain. I believe that some computer programs may acquire some sort of will, that most superior organisms (including flies, likely) have a will, but not that a chair or a particle has it.
#13 FTW. I seriously laughed out loud for a minute, and had to share with my wife. Kudos!
The hidden variables could very well be local, just not along any dimension you would know to measure. Randomness is just a way of saying that there is something going on that you have no current means of detecting and/or predicting.
Free will? What free will? A neuron fires, you do a thing. It's that simple. You are a neuronal machine. The gears turn, you do stuff. The only really interesting question is where the "isness" of our experiences comes from, and THAT is most likely a universal phenomenon. We think we're special because we're collections of highly structured isness, yet we have trouble conceiving of any universe or system that doesn't put our experiences and our substance at the top of some existential pile.
Silly honams.