CIA's Psychology of Intelligence Analysis book online
The CIA has posted the full text of one of its guidebooks, "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis." The 1999 book was published by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. It's interesting to just dip into it randomly and read little bits here and there.
Previously on BB:
• Puzzles vs. mysteries in Smithsonian Link
Link (via Further: Strange Attractor & Beyond)Of the diverse problems that impede accurate intelligence analysis, those inherent in human mental processes are surely among the most important and most difficult to deal with. Intelligence analysis is fundamentally a mental process, but understanding this process is hindered by the lack of conscious awareness of the workings of our own minds...
"When we speak of improving the mind we are usually referring to the acquisition of information or knowledge, or to the type of thoughts one should have, and not to the actual functioning of the mind. We spend little time monitoring our own thinking and comparing it with a more sophisticated ideal."
When we speak of improving intelligence analysis, we are usually referring to the quality of writing, types of analytical products, relations between intelligence analysts and intelligence consumers, or organization of the analytical process. Little attention is devoted to improving how analysts think.
Thinking analytically is a skill like carpentry or driving a car. It can be taught, it can be learned, and it can improve with practice. But like many other skills, such as riding a bike, it is not learned by sitting in a classroom and being told how to do it. Analysts learn by doing. Most people achieve at least a minimally acceptable level of analytical performance with little conscious effort beyond completing their education. With much effort and hard work, however, analysts can achieve a level of excellence beyond what comes naturally...
A central focus of this book is to illuminate the role of the observer in determining what is observed and how it is interpreted. People construct their own version of "reality" on the basis of information provided by the senses, but this sensory input is mediated by complex mental processes that determine which information is attended to, how it is organized, and the meaning attributed to it. What people perceive, how readily they perceive it, and how they process this information after receiving it are all strongly influenced by past experience, education, cultural values, role requirements, and organizational norms, as well as by the specifics of the information received.
This process may be visualized as perceiving the world through a lens or screen that channels and focuses and thereby may distort the images that are seen.
Previously on BB:
• Puzzles vs. mysteries in Smithsonian Link
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It is by will alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of sapho that thoughts acquire speed, the lips acquire stains, the stains become a warning. It is by will alone I set my mind in motion.
I guess I found the next book I'm going to read.
The book really looks awesome ;) hope it reads as well.
Another great read that I use a class material (though you have to buy it) is "The Thinker's Toolkit", by Morgan Jones, who taught analytic techniques at the CIA.
The analysts work very hard at sorting out the data for hard decisions with incomplete information given by very human subjects. It's a pity that their agency and policy makers have floundered so badly with the results.
@Thinkerer (#3), That does look like an interesting book. Thanks for the tip! At Institute for the Future, we try to distinguish between "problems" (that can be solved) and "dilemmas" (which have to be managed but can't be solved.) This notion definitely relates to the challenges of the intelligence community. More on that thought in this previous post.
Damn you Boing Boing, another free book.
I've already got a backlog of of about twenty to read with all the free stuff you keep pointing out.
This was a text book (as well as "The Thinker's Tool Kit") in my cognitive analysis class for my MA in Emergency Management. It is very insightful. As an aside, the topic for the final was an analysis of the JonBenét Ramsey case using the principles taught by the authors. This required all secondary source information, as the DA has yet to release anything, like much analysis is. For what it is worth, based on my analysis, the mother was innocent, the police department incompetent, and the press out of control in search of a buck. The press is the price of freedom, but demonstrating some civil responsibilities to go with the freedoms rather then "me first" chasing a buck is what makes a civil society. IHMO
Tell us the truth about UFO you damned CIA !
The CIA has always maintained that they don't particularly have access to superior information, they simply apply superior analysis. It sort of works to cross purposes to say that, of course, since the case for war in Iraq didn't make any sense on the information available to the public. It will be interesting to see what kind of superior analysis goes into these policy reports.
Thanks so much for the resource - it's nice to have a fairly-authoritative-but-still-accessible resource on cognitive bias. Perhaps the best part is that practically every claim is footnoted, in case you want to look up the journal article he's citing as evidence.
I don't think this only applies to intelligence analysis, though. I find it hard to think of a field where a grasp of cognitive bias wouldn't be a huge benefit.
@Shiseiji - MA in Emergency Management, that sounds awesome!
#8 - There are many media reports of the semi-revolt in CIA for the then CIA chief giving Bush what he and Chaney wanted to hear, not what many (but not all) of the analysts truly thought of the information. I have seen it in both government service and the private sector, as Simon and Garfunkel put it "A man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest." And the people who fear not being in power will tell themselves the ends justifies the means, even if the "little people" don't agree or even know. IMHO
The degree was an interesting experience, especially as I stay as far from Homeland Security as I can get. Even decided to push back at a Prof. and it cost me a B+ rather then an "A" for not agreeing with his positions made known through "ad hoc" optional reading material. I showed how analysis can be used to balance threat and freedom.
"ESSENTIAL LIBERTIES, PUBLIC FEAR, SECURITY, PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS: BALANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY" (Title too long, - points)
Introduction
In Fear Less: Real Truth About Risk, Safety, and Security in a Time of Terrorism, Galvin de Becker devotes an entire chapter to the idea that “Denial is the psychological defense mechanism we unconsciously deploy to make unpleasant truths go away . . .” and to over come fear, we must “change what we can change, and to accept what we cannot change.” (1). Yet as with the case of Pontius Pilate, the “truth” of what can or cannot be changed, what must, or must not be changed, can take on many forms, often in the eye of the beholder.
On February 17, 1775, Benjamin Franklin, following his return from England where he had gone with an intent to retain local representative government while remaining loyal to the King of England, told his fellow Americans: “They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” Franklin went on to become one of the chief architects of American Constitutional Government.
On November 19, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln spoke what have become some of the most profound words in American Republic thought: “. . . that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” (2) Revered as one of our greatest Presidents, Lincoln spoke these words even as the writ of habeas corpus was suspended.
On March 4, 1933, newly elected President Franklin Roosevelt spoke of fear of economic hardship in his inaugural address. “This is preeminently the time to speak the truth, the whole truth, frankly and boldly. Nor need we shrink from honestly facing conditions in our country today. This great Nation will endure, as it has endured, will revive and will prosper.
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself -- nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. In every dark hour of our national life, a leadership of frankness and of vigor has met with that understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory. And I am convinced that you will again give that support to leadership in these critical days.” (3). Roosevelt went on to institute the New Deal with three major components: direct relief, economic recovery, and financial reform which lead to a major constitutional battle. By 1945 most of the programs were dismantled, World War II having had a major impact on the economic requirement.
On February 19, 1942, following the attack on Perl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War “. . . to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.” (5) This order resulted in the relocation of over 110,000 people, the internment of 65,000 Japanese Americans and aliens, 5,000 German Americans and aliens, and 300 Italian Americans and aliens. Not however from Hawaii, where Japanese aliens, naturalized and born citizens were critical to the territory’s economic lifeblood, sugar. Although revered as a great president, the Twenty Second Amendment to the US Constitution ensured he was the last President to serve three terms.
Powerful emotions, such as fear, can drive humans to paralysis or acts which others believe must be punished by death. Execution for desertion has fallen out of favor only in the last century, though many still doubt the condition of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. We are left with the struggle of immediate fear and consequences history indicates we may come to regret as with the Japanese Internment.
I believe we can preserve our essential liberties only if we balance public policy decisions with strict accountability. If not, fear promulgated by media intent on selling a product will lead to losses we could all easily come to regret.
In the words of George Santayana: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” (14)
In the words of Galvin de Becker: “Changed forever, forever the same.”(4)
Heuer's Psychology Of Intelligence Analysis is a classic but it has actually been online since 1999. I know becasue that is when I first found it. Since the book went out of print, we have used the online version in our Advanced Intelligence Analysis class at Mercyhurst for at least the last 5 years. The book, I believe, is based on a series of tradecraft notes Heuer made for CIA analysts in the 1980's. My understanding is that Heuer is working on an updated edition.
Or as South Park say it: "The terrorists are attacking us in our Imagination. We need to get our imaginations under control!"
I was all "lalalala - Thanks BB, yet another wonderful book I will never find time for and never get on the half-priced bookshelf" - until one of the comments said "FREE". Obviously I need to get this book - I need to RTFA or at least skim it better!
*yoink*
Most will want to download this book free from the CIA website, but many fans of this book prefer having a hard copy. The book has been out of print for several years, except for a low quality rip-off copy. However, a reprint approved by the author is now available on Amazon and is being used for training in the Intelligence Community.
I was fortunate to take a course in college on Intelligence and U.S. Policy, taught by a CIA "Officer-in-Residence." (Basically, CIA case officers and analysts who would get two-year appointments as visiting professors... very cool!) Heuer's book was one of our assigned textbooks, and a fascinating read in itself. I was especially influenced by three parts:
-the chapter on the need for analysts to train their minds to understand and process ambiguous information. "We perceive what we expect we will perceive." ... truer words were never spoken.
-the chapter on "do you REALLY need more information;" I was astounded by the finding that while more information may make you more confident that your decision is right, above a certain level more information does not lead to a better decision.
-the process a good analyst goes through when considering differing hypotheses - especially defining possible "diagnostic" future events that would support or falsify the different hypotheses, and looking to disprove hypotheses rather than prove them.
Now I just wish that the CIA would actually take its own advice. Oh well. ;)