Schneier: transparency is not security

Bruce Schneier's latest column takes on the notion of the "transparent society," in which all parties disclose everything and privacy is traded for knowledge. I've always been skeptical about this idea because there's no way to be sure that the powerful are really disclosing everything (in the UK, the tax-man has a special, secret high-security online tax-filing system for the hyper-rich, which came to light last December — if the rich get their own tax-system, why should we believe they won't have their own "disclosure" system, too?). But Schneier addresses another, more compelling dimension: when the powerful disclose their information to you, you can't do much with it; but when you disclose to the powerful, there's plenty that can be done to you.

An example will make this clearer. You're stopped by a police officer, who demands to see identification. Divulging your identity will give the officer enormous power over you: He or she can search police databases using the information on your ID; he or she can create a police record attached to your name; he or she can put you on this or that secret terrorist watch list. Asking to see the officer's ID in return gives you no comparable power over him or her. The power imbalance is too great, and mutual disclosure does not make it OK.

You can think of your existing power as the exponent in an equation that determines the value, to you, of more information. The more power you have, the more additional power you derive from the new data.

Another example: When your doctor says "take off your clothes," it makes no sense for you to say, "You first, doc." The two of you are not engaging in an interaction of equals.

Link

(via Futurismic)