In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social, Not Electronic
Noah Shachtman has new piece out in Wired exploring the reported drop in violence in Iraq in recent months. He argues that this is the result of the US abandoning its somewhat techno-centric approach to prosecuting the war -- and focusing instead on Iraq's social, political, tribal, and cultural networks. Snip:
The war was launched, in part, on a premise that you could wipe out more bad guys with fewer troops, as long as those troops were networked together. Businesses like Wal-Mart made their supply chain more efficient through information technology; the military could do the same with its "kill chain," the theory of network-centric warfare went.Link. More out-takes from the reporting process will no doubt show up in Noah's blog posts at Danger Room.The idea -- first popularized in article published ten years ago, next month -- pretty much worked as advertised, for a while. The problem is, killing people more efficiently is one of the last things you need to do a counterinsurgency situation, like the one the U.S. is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, you need to take steps to reinforce civil society, rather than blowing it apart. And that takes an understanding of the society you're trying to build.
For the story, I scored a rare opportunity to spend time with a U.S. "psychological operations" team, getting into the heads of the people of Fallujah; hung out with an Army colonel who worked his tribal connections to bring stability to one of Iraq's roughest towns; spent time with the heads of a controversial program to embed anthropologists into combat units; and interviewed General David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq.
Photo: shot by Todd Hido in Iraq for Wired. A tattered flag flies from a cell phone antenna.
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It's much worse than an over-reliance or mis-application of technology, or having the means justify the end, it's mistaking a means for an end.
Jeff Huber just put up an excellent essay on this which can be summed up by the two quotes by Clausewitz:
"Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa."
and
"If we do not learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of value in themselves, we are liable to regard them as windfall profits."
The most efficient "kill-chain" won't do squat unless there is a clear and achievable objective. The other problem is that the "kill-chain" that is being used is purpose built for set piece battles between great powers basically 2nd generation warfare (web 1.0) versus 4th generation asymmetric warfare. (not to say that a theoretical "kill-chain" couldn't be constructed to be effective for insurgencies but that simply isn't sexy enough to be funded)
You don't even need Clausewitz, Powell will suffice. To use a shortened version of the Powell doctrine:
- Do we have a clear attainable objective?
- Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
- Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
- Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
- Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
This is exactly the conclusion drawn by Thomas Ricks in Fiasco-- a lesson learned and then forgotten after Vietnam now, finally (maybe) being learned in Iraq. But let us not forget that an unjust war well-prosecuted is still an unjust war.
When I first saw the headline, I expected the article to read more like this:
I knew something positive would come out of this social networking thing, eventually...
JCCalhoun, where have you been teaching, that you've never had a student that could write at that level? It's a cute little piece, but it's not off the curve.
Graham, you're being a bore. You don't like the subject, don't read the entry.
Man, I'm running low on chasers. Try this and see if it helps.